St. John's Law Review
Volume 87, Spring-Summer 2013, Numbers 2-3

Article 2

The Time for a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Is Now
Ryan K. Bakhtiari
Katrina Boice
Jeffrey S. Majors

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

FINAL_BAKHTIARI, BOICE & MAJORS

2/27/2014 6:20 PM

THE TIME FOR A UNIFORM FIDUCIARY
DUTY IS NOW
RYAN K. BAKHTIARI†
KATRINA BOICE††
JEFFREY S. MAJORS†††
INTRODUCTION
Warren Buffet famously said, “It’s only when the tide goes
out that you learn who’s been swimming naked.”1 The 2008
mortgage meltdown brought to light fraud of an unprecedented
nature, perpetrated through the sale of defective or fraudulent
securities.2 With investor confidence already shaken by the
Enron, WorldCom, HealthSouth, and Tyco scandals, banks
peddled high-risk mortgages to less-than-creditworthy borrowers
chasing the American dream of home ownership.
When
mortgages and the housing market unraveled, chaos followed.
The 2008 collapse led to the government-brokered sale of
Bear Stearns, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the fire sales of
Merrill Lynch and Wachovia, and government takeovers of AIG
and Washington Mutual.
Billion dollar Ponzi schemes
orchestrated by Bernard L. Madoff, R. Allan Stanford, and Scott
W. Rothstein, and product scandals like the Abacus CDO
placement, which demonstrated how large investment banks
take substantial positions against their own customers, have
rocked investor confidence. The disappearance of customer
money at MF Global, reports of LIBOR rigging by multinational
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Alex Crippen, Warren Buffett and the Perils of Swimming Naked, CNBC (Aug.
6, 2007, 1:38 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/ 20147026/Warren_Buffett_and_the_
Perils_of_Swimming_Naked.
2
See, e.g., Bozeman Man Faces Up to 200 Years for Investment Scam, MONT.
COMM’R OF SEC. & INS. (Mar. 22, 2012), http://sao.mt.gov/news/2012/03222012_
reynoldswanted.asp (describing a Ponzi scheme victimizing individuals from twentyone states and six countries).
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banks, the recent near collapse of market-maker Knight Capital,
and the botched Facebook IPO provide constant reminders to
Main Street investors who were wiped out by Wall Street. In
isolation, these events are problematic.
Together, they
emphasize the economic reality that the time for a strong broadbased fiduciary duty is now.
The 2008 collapse focused attention on how to better protect
investors from securities sellers and advisers who purport to offer
unbiased advice, yet do not disclose meaningful conflicts of
interest. The push to protect ordinary investors by imposing a
uniform fiduciary duty for brokers and investment advisers has
gained momentum.3 This Article examines differences in the
standard of care currently owed by financial professionals and
the arguments for and against imposing a uniform fiduciary
standard.
I.

THE 2008 CREDIT CRISIS REQUIRES REMEDIAL ACTION

In the years leading up to the 2008 meltdown, investors were
sold securities marketed as safe, secure, and income-producing
by investment advisers and broker-dealers. In truth, investors
were sold funds that owned toxic tranches of subprime mortgage
securities and other byproducts of the real estate boom. In 2009,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
Chairman, Mary L. Schapiro, recognized that these complex
financial products impaired an investor’s ability to make an
informed decision:
This marketplace demands that we constantly find new
approaches and strategies, build new tools and think of new
ways to out-compete the competition.
This push for innovation constantly changes the face of the
financial industry, as smart minds discover new ways to create
wealth or manage risk. No doubt, great good can come from
this. It can enable vibrant markets where entrepreneurs can
access the capital they need to transform their vision into new
products and personal success.
But innovation creates challenges as well.

3
Sharon Epperson & Chris Murphey, Debate Continues Over Standards for
Advisors, Broker-Dealers, CNBC (May 11, 2011, 1:44 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/
42650944/Debate_Continues_Over_Standards_for_Advisors_Broker_Dealers; Tara
Siegel Bernard, Dear S.E.C., Please Make Brokers Accountable to Customers, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at B1.
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It can foster incredibly complex financial products that fail to
live up to buyers’ expectations, but generate fees for their
creators and sellers. This complexity can bury important
information needed for effective decision-making, so that even
the most sophisticated are unable to make informed judgments
about risk and payoff. Finally, it can mask old-fashioned
manipulation and fraud.
But whether innovation is used for good or ill, to improve the
system or to manipulate it—it creates a challenge for regulators
with limited resources trying to keep up with the industries
they regulate.
This was particularly true when I became Chairman of the
SEC in late January 2009 in the wake of the financial crisis.4

Since the marketplace is ever-changing, which in turn
creates the development of complex financial products, the need
for a uniform fiduciary standard is essential so that customers
can be certain that their interests are protected no matter which
type of industry professional recommends the purchase of an
investment.
II. INVESTMENT ADVISERS VS. BROKER-DEALERS
There are two primary types of professionals that investors
seek for advice and services: investment advisers and brokerdealers.5 Although the two are nearly identical in that they
provide customized financial advice to customers, they are
currently regulated by separate securities acts and adhere to
different standards of conduct.6 In recent years, a hybrid model
has emerged whereby financial professionals are registered as
both brokers and investment advisers, resulting in dual
registration.7
4
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Brodsky Family Lecture
at Northwestern University School of Law (Nov. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch110910mls.htm.
5
Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 701 (2010).
6
Id. at 701–02.
7
See Dan LeGaye, Dual Registration and FINRA Supervision, PRAC.
COMPLIANCE & RISK MGMT. FOR THE SEC. INDUSTRY 17 (May–June 2010), available
at http://www.legayelaw.com/file/201005%20Article%20-%20Dual%20Registration.
pdf (noting the supervisory issues relating to dual registration); see also U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS iii
(2011) [hereinafter STAFF STUDY], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
2011/913studyfinal.pdf (“Approximately 5% of Commission-registered investment
advisers are also registered as broker-dealers, and . . . [a]pproximately 18% of
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Investment Advisers

As of May 2012, there were more than 12,600 investment
advisers registered with the SEC with nearly $50 trillion in
assets under management.8 “This represents a 9% increase in
the number of advisers registered with the [SEC] since July
2011.”9 The SEC, under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(“Advisers Act”), regulates investment advisers.10 The Advisers
Act defines an “investment adviser” as
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.11

Under the Advisers Act, investment advisers are held to a
“fiduciary” standard of care.12 The Supreme Court’s decision in
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,13 is the most
commonly cited source for the investment adviser fiduciary duty,
wherein the Court held that an investment adviser has a
fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act.14 The SEC has recognized
that “[i]t is not entirely clear whether the federal fiduciary duty
established by the Court in Capital Gains is an example of judgemade common law, an interpretation of the Section 206 of the
Advisers Act.”15 Nonetheless, the SEC has confirmed that
“[t]here is no doubt, however, that an investment adviser is
subject to the federal fiduciary duty.”16 Further, the SEC has
FINRA-registered broker-dealers also are registered as investment advisers with the
Commission or a state.”).
8
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Advocating for Greater
Federal and State Securities Regulatory Cooperation and Collaboration (May 7,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch050712laa.htm.
9
Id.
10
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b–1 to –21 (2012).
11
§ 80b–2(a)(11).
12
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963).
13
Id. at 180.
14
Id. at 191–92 (noting other courts have found that Congress recognized that
an investment advisor is a fiduciary with “an affirmative duty of ‘utmost good faith,
and full and fair disclosure of all material facts,’ as well as an affirmative obligation
‘to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading’ his clients”).
15
Memorandum from the Investor as Purchaser Subcomm. 3–4 (Feb. 15, 2010)
[hereinafter Memorandum], available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/invadvcomm/
iacmemofiduciaryduty.pdf.
16
Id. at 4.
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recognized that the fiduciary duty standard includes the duties of
loyalty and care, which require investment advisers to put the
interests of clients ahead of their own and to disclose or eliminate
material conflicts of interest.17
B.

Broker-Dealers

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
oversees approximately 4,245 brokerage firms, 162,230 branch
offices, and 633,150 registered-representatives.18 The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) regulates the business
activities of broker-dealers.19 The Exchange Act defines “broker”
to mean “any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others”20 and “dealer”
to mean “any person engaged in the business of buying and
selling securities . . . for such person’s own account through a
broker or otherwise.”21 Although the SEC has authority to adopt
federal standards of competence,22 the specific rules applicable to
the broker-dealer profession are proscribed and enforced by
FINRA.23
Since broker-dealers are generally excluded from the
Advisers Act, they are not subject to a federal “fiduciary”
standard of care. 24 Instead, and in the absence of a higher

17

See STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 22.
About
the
Financial
Industry
Regulatory
Authority,
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA (last visited Aug. 1, 2013); see STAFF STUDY,
supra note 7 (“The Commission and FINRA oversee approximately 5,100 brokerdealers. As of the end of 2009, FINRA-registered broker-dealers held over 109
million retail and institutional accounts.”).
19
See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, 48
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78pp (2012)).
20
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A).
21
Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
22
Barbara Black, How To Improve Retail Investor Protection After the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 63
(2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7), (c)(2)(D)).
23
See Get to Know Us, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/
@corp/@about/documents/corporate/p118667.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2013)
(explaining that part of FINRA's duties are “writing and enforcing rules governing
the activities of nearly 4,400 securities firms with approximately 630,000 brokers”);
see also Black, supra note 22, at 63.
24
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (excluding any broker or dealer whose services
are solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who
does not receive any compensation for such services); see also Memorandum, supra
note 15, at 5–6 (“The broker [dealer] exclusion [to the Advisers Act] is available if
18
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standard imposed by case law, broker-dealers are held to a
“suitability” standard of care under FINRA Rules. FINRA rules
require broker-dealers to deal fairly and honestly with customers
in accordance with industry standards, to recommend only
“suitable” investments, and to seek the best execution for
customers’ orders.25 Newly adopted FINRA Rule 2111 sets forth
the “suitability” standard of care as follows:
(a) A member or an associated person must have a reasonable
basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment
strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the
customer, based on the information obtained through the
reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to
ascertain the customer’s investment profile. A customer’s
investment profile includes, but is not limited to, the customer’s
age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax
status,
investment
objectives,
investment
experience,
investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and
any other information the customer may disclose to the member
or associated person in connection with such recommendation.
(b) A member or associated person fulfills the customer-specific
suitability obligation for an institutional account, as defined in
Rule 4512(c), if (1) the member or associated person has a
reasonable basis to believe that the institutional customer is
capable of evaluating investment risks independently, both in
general and with regard to particular transactions and
investment strategies involving a security or securities and (2)
the institutional customer affirmatively indicates that it is
exercising independent judgment in evaluating the member’s or
associated person’s recommendations. Where an institutional
customer has delegated decisionmaking authority to an agent,
such as an investment adviser or a bank trust department,
these factors shall be applied to the agent.26

two conditions are satisfied: (1) no special compensation is received and (2) the
advice is solely incidental to the broker’s brokerage activities.”).
25
See FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859; FINRA Rule 5310, available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=104
55; see also NASD Rule 2310, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3638 (superseded by FINRA Rule 2111).
26
FINRA Rule 2111. This rule was introduced with the filing of SR-FINRA2010-039, which was approved by the SEC and effective as of July 9, 2012. Id. Prior
to July 9, 2012, NASD Rule 2310, Recommendations to Customers (Suitability),
governed broker-dealers’ “suitability” standard of care. See NASD Rule 2310.
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Although FINRA Rule 2111 recognizes that broker-dealers’
duties to the customer are not limited to the point of purchase of
investments, the “suitability” standard is less than the standard
of care afforded by a fiduciary standard.27
III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BROKERS AND INVESTMENT
ADVISERS IS UNCLEAR TO THE PUBLIC
In 2008, the SEC commissioned the RAND Corporation to
determine the effectiveness of existing regulations for brokers
and investment advisers.28 The RAND report acknowledged: “In
recent years, the evolution of the financial service industry has
blurred traditional distinctions between broker-dealers and
investment advisers and made it difficult to design appropriate
regulatory schemes for their professional services.”29 The report
indicated that many investors “do not understand key
distinctions between investment advisers and broker-dealers—
their duties, the titles they use, the firms for which they work, or
the services they offer.” 30 The survey results demonstrated that
63% of investors believe brokers provide advice about securities
as part of their regular business; 51% of investors believe brokers
recommend specific investments; 42% of investors believe brokers
are required by law to act in the client’s best interest, i.e., that
brokers owe their customers a fiduciary duty; and 58% of
investors believe brokers are required by law to disclose conflicts
of interest.31
Obvious factors contributing to investor confusion are the
“[m]arketplace changes that have resulted in investment
advisers and broker-dealers offering similar services.”32
27

See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12–25, Suitability: Additional Guidance on
FINRA’s New Suitability Rule, at 6–7 (May 2012), http://www.finra.org/
web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p126431.pdf (noting that
recommendations to hold securities, maintain or change investment strategies, or
buy or sell securities does not create an ongoing obligation to monitor and make
additional recommendations).
28
ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS iii (2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf. RAND is a “nonprofit research organization
providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges
facing the public and private sectors around the world.” Id. at ii.
29
Id. at iii.
30
Id. at 112–13.
31
Id. at 89.
32
Id. at 20.
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Traditionally, the primary role of a broker-dealer was to execute
securities transactions on the client’s behalf.33 Technological
advances and the deregulation of commissions on securities
transactions have impacted the profitability of this role.34 In
response, broker-dealers began to provide additional financial
planning services and use titles such as “adviser” or “financial
adviser” for their broker-dealer registered representatives.35
The following year, the Obama Administration released a
plan for financial reform.36 President Barack Obama stated it
would be “a transformation on a scale not seen since the reforms
that followed the Great Depression.”37 The plan, referred to as
the “White Paper,”38 sought to end the financial crisis and
“restore confidence in the integrity of our financial system.”39
The White Paper acknowledged that the government could have
done more to prevent many of the problems that contributed or
resulted from the 2008 financial crisis.40 In response, the White
Paper laid out five reforms through which the administration
sought to: (1) “[p]romote robust supervision and regulation of
financial firms”; (2) “[e]stablish comprehensive supervision of
financial markets”; (3) “[p]rotect consumers and investors from

33
Ross Jordan, Note, Thinking Before Rulemaking: Why the SEC Should Think
Twice Before Imposing a Uniform Fiduciary Standard on Broker-Dealers and
Investment Advisors, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 491, 496 (2012) (citing Laby, supra
note 5, at 423–24).
34
Id.
35
See id. at 496–97 (citing Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties of BrokersAdvisers-Financial Planners and Money Managers 10–11 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 09-36, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1446750 (discussing the expanded list of services offered by many
broker-dealers)); Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and
Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 404 (2010); see also Laby, supra note 5, at
734 (“Today, advances in technology have reduced the time and cost to process
trades. As a result, the advice component of brokerage business has eclipsed
transaction execution in importance.”).
36
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on 21st
Century Fin. Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009) (on file with author).
37
Id.
38
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama To Announce
Comprehensive Plan for Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009) (on file with author);
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf
[hereinafter
WHITE PAPER].
39
WHITE PAPER, supra note 38, at 2.
40
Id.
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financial abuse”; (4) “[p]rovide the government with the tools it
needs to manage financial crises”; and (5) “[r]aise international
regulatory standards and improve international cooperation.”41
The White Paper was consistent with the RAND report and
cited confusion among investors regarding the disparity between
regulations governing broker-dealers and investment advisers.42
The White Paper noted, “the legal distinction between the two is
no longer meaningful. Retail customers repose the same degree
of trust in their brokers as they do in investment advisers, but
the legal responsibilities of the intermediaries may not be the
same.”43 In an effort to address the confusion, the White Paper
recommended that Congress “empower the SEC to increase
fairness for investors” by “[e]stablish[ing] a fiduciary duty for
broker-dealers offering investment advice and harmonize the
regulation of investment advisers and broker-dealers.”44 The
White Paper further emphasized:
Standards of care for all broker-dealers when providing
investment advice about securities to retail investors should be
raised to the fiduciary standard to align the legal framework
with investment advisers. In addition, the SEC should be
empowered to examine and ban forms of compensation that
encourage intermediaries to put investors into products that are
profitable to the intermediary, but are not in the investors’ best
interest.45

The White Paper “formed the basis of the broad-based
legislative review of financial services regulation that culminated
in the Dodd-Frank [Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act].”46
Following the publication of the RAND report and White
Paper, regulators recognized the need to hold broker-dealers to
the same standard of conduct as investment advisers. Mary
Schapiro told participants at a Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association (“SIFMA”) conference:
“I believe that

41

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 71.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 71–72.
46
MERCER BULLARD, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, PROTECTING
INVESTORS—ESTABLISHING THE SEC FIDUCIARY DUTY STANDARD 3 (2011), available
at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/091311aarpreport.pdf.
42
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broker-dealers and investment advisers providing the same
services, especially to retail investors, should meet that same
high fiduciary standard . . . .”47
IV. DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
On July 21, 2010, a little more than a year after the White
Paper was published, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act48 was signed into law with the mission
“[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer
by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices, and for other purposes.”49
Dodd-Frank
recognized investors’ confusion and lack of confidence in the
financial system by enacting section 913, Study and Rulemaking
Regarding Obligations of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment
Advisers. Section 913 required the SEC to conduct a study to
evaluate:
(1) the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of
care for brokers, dealers, investment advisers, persons
associated with brokers or dealers, and persons associated with
investment advisers for providing personalized investment
advice and recommendations about securities to retail
customers imposed by the Commission and a national securities
association, and other Federal and State legal or regulatory
standards; and
(2) whether there are legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or
overlaps in legal or regulatory standards in the protection of
retail customers relating to the standards of care for brokers,
dealers, investment advisers, persons associated with brokers or
dealers, and persons associated with investment advisers for
providing personalized investment advice about securities to
retail customers that should be addressed by rule or statute.50

47
Ronald D. Orol, SEC: Broker-Dealers Should Be Held to Fiduciary Standard,
MARKETWATCH, May 6, 2010, http://articles.marketwatch.com/2010-05-06/economy/
30747556_1_dealers-bank-reform-schapiro.
48
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreet
reform-cpa.pdf.
49
Id.
50
Id. § 913(b)(1).
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Section 913 required the SEC to conduct a study examining
existing standards of care for broker-dealers and investment
advisers and to evaluate whether imposing a fiduciary standard
on broker-dealers would ensure that investors are receiving
appropriate and tailored investment advice from brokerdealers.51
V.

SEC CONCLUSIONS

On January 22, 2011, the SEC fulfilled the mandate under
section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act by releasing its Study
Recommending a Uniform Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers (“Staff Study”).52 As is
evidenced from the title of the Staff Study, “[t]he overarching
recommendation in the [Staff] Study is that the SEC should
adopt a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisers and
broker-dealers.”53 Specifically, the Staff Study provided:
Consistent with Congress’s grant of authority in Section 913,
the Staff recommends the consideration of rulemakings that
would apply expressly and uniformly to both broker-dealers and
investment advisers, when providing personalized investment
advice about securities to retail customers, a fiduciary standard
no less stringent than currently applied to investment advisers
under Advisers Act Sections 206(1) and (2). In particular, the
Staff recommends that the Commission exercise its rulemaking
authority under Dodd-Frank Act Section 913(g), which permits
the Commission to promulgate rules to provide that:
the standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers, when providing personalized
investment advice about securities to retail customers (and
such other customers as the Commission may by rule

51

Jordan, supra note 33, at 491–92; see § 913(c)(5) (amending the Exchange Act
and the Advisers Act to grant the SEC the authority to establish a fiduciary duty
for broker-dealers “when providing personalized investment advice and
recommendations about securities to retail customers”).
52
Jordan, supra note 33, at 499; Press Release, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, SEC
Releases Staff Study Recommending a Uniform Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers (Jan. 22, 2011) (on file with author); STAFF
STUDY, supra note 7, at ii.
53
Jordan, supra note 33, at 499.
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provide), shall be to act in the best interest of the customer
without regard to the financial or other interest of the
broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.54

In conducting the Study, the Staff met with interested
parties, representatives of the financial services industry, state
securities
regulators,
the
North
American
Securities
Administrator
Association
(“NASAA”),
and
FINRA.55
Additionally, the Staff reviewed over 3,500 comment letters
many of which stated, inter alia, that investors are confused
about the differences between investment advisers and brokerdealers and the standards of conduct applicable to each.56 In
response, the Staff Study recommended the implementation of a
uniform fiduciary duty to “increase investor protection and
decrease investor confusion in the most practicable, least
burdensome way for investors, broker-dealers and investment
advisers.”57
The Staff Study identified key components of a uniform
fiduciary duty standard as being the duties of loyalty and care.58
The Staff Study recommended that, in implementing a uniform
fiduciary standard, the SEC “should engage in rulemaking and/or
issue interpretive guidance addressing the[se] components.”59
Specifically, the Staff Study noted that the duty of loyalty
requires eliminating and/or disclosing conflicts of interest and
recommended that the SEC “prohibit certain conflicts and
facilitate the provision of uniform, simple and clear disclosures to
retail investors about the terms of their relationships with
broker-dealers and investment advisers, including any material
conflicts of interest.”60 As for the duty of care, the Staff Study
54
STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at v–vi (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g)); Jordan, supra note 33, at 499.
55
STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at ii; Jordan, supra note 33, at 499.
56
STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at v (“Many retail investors and investor
advocates submitted comments stating that retail investors do not understand the
differences between investment advisers and broker-dealers or the standards of care
applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers. Many find the standards of
care confusing, and are uncertain about the meaning of the various titles and
designations used by investment advisers and broker-dealers. Many expect that both
investment advisers and broker-dealers are obligated to act in the investors’ best
interests.”); Jordan, supra note 33, at 499.
57
STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at v.
58
See id. at vii.
59
Id. at vi.
60
Id. at vii. (As part of the disclosures required under the duty of loyalty, the
Study recommended that the SEC consider: “which disclosures might be provided
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recommended the SEC specify uniform standards for the
standard of care owed to retail investors, including the basis for
making recommendations to an investor.”61
In addition to the duties of loyalty and care, the Staff Study
recommended that the SEC “address through interpretative
guidance and/or rule making how broker-dealers should fulfill
the uniform fiduciary standard when engaging in principal
trading”; “engage in rulecmaking and/or issue interpretive
guidance to explain what it means to provide ‘personalized
investment advice about securities’ ”; and consider “investor
education outreach as an important complement to the uniform
fiduciary standard.”62
The SEC concluded that imposing a uniform fiduciary
standard would provide the following benefits: heightened
investor protection and awareness; flexibility to accommodate
diverse business models and fee structures; preservation of
investor choice; continued investor access to existing products,
services, and service providers; continued duties under applicable
law for investment advisers and broker-dealers; and receipt of
investment advice that is in an investor’s best interest.63
A.

SEC Commissioners Found Shortcomings in the Staff Study

SEC commissioners, Kathleen L. Casey and Troy A. Paredes,
found shortcomings in the Staff Study, stating:
[T]he Study’s pervasive shortcoming is that it fails to
adequately justify its recommendation that the Commission
embark on fundamentally changing the regulatory regime for
broker-dealers and investment advisers providing personalized
investment advice to retail investors[;]
The Study recommends the adoption of a new uniform fiduciary
duty standard and harmonization of two disparate regulatory
regimes. But it does so without adequate articulation or
substantiation of the problems that would purportedly be
addressed via that regulation[;]

most effectively”; “the utility and feasibility of a summary relationship disclosure
document”; and “whether rulemaking would be appropriate to prohibit certain
conflicts, to require firms to mitigate conflicts through specific action, or to impose
specific disclosure and consent requirements.”).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at viii.
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The Study also does not adequately recognize the risk that its
recommendations could adversely impact investors[;]
....
. . . [W]e oppose the Study’s release to Congress as drafted. We
do not believe the Study fulfills the statutory mandate of
Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act to evaluate the ‘effectiveness
of existing legal or regulatory standards of care’ applicable to
broker-dealers and investment advisers[;]
....
. . . [T]he practical consequences resulting from that confusion
for those very investors have not been sufficiently studied or
documented.
Moreover, the Study does not address the
possibility that the Study’s own recommendations will not
resolve or eliminate investor confusion and may in fact create
new sources of confusion[;]
. . . The Study unduly discounts the risk that, as a result of the
regulatory burdens imposed by the recommendations on
financial professionals, investors may have fewer broker-dealers
and investment advisers to choose from, may have access to
fewer products and services, and may have to pay more for the
services and advice they do receive[;]
....
. . . Regulation based on poorly-supported recommendations
runs the risk of restricting retail investors’ access to affordable
personalized investment advice and the range of products and
services they currently enjoy.64

In addition, Casey and Paredes observed that there is no
statutory deadline for any follow-up rulemaking to the Staff
Study, and additional research and analysis are needed before
rules are proposed to determine:
[I]nvestor returns (controlling for risk and investor
characteristics such as age, income, and education) generated
under the two existing regulatory regimes[;]
Comparison of the security selections of financial professionals
subject to the two existing regulatory regimes in an effort to
gauge differences in the quality of advice or types of product
recommendations as a function of the regulatory regimes[;]
Surveys of investors to obtain a general overview of the
characteristics of investors who invest through a broker-dealer

64
Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Statement by SEC Commissioners: Statement Regarding Study on Investment
Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/
spch012211klctap.htm.
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as compared to those who invest on the basis of advice from an
investment adviser and to develop an understanding of investor
perceptions of the cost/benefit tradeoffs of each regulatory
regime[;]
Consideration of evidence related to the ability of investors to
bring claims against their financial professional under each
regulatory regime, with a particular focus on dollar costs to the
investor and the results when claims are brought.65

B.

Timetable for a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Remains
Undetermined

On April 9, 2012, the SEC announced the formation of a new
Investor Advisory Committee.66 The purpose of the Investor
Advisory Committee is “to advise the Commission on regulatory
priorities, the regulation of securities products, trading
strategies, fee structures, the effectiveness of disclosure, and on
initiatives to protect investor interests and to promote investor
confidence and the integrity of the securities marketplace.”67
Currently, the SEC’s website reflects that the rule
implementation timetable has been extended and remains
undetermined.68
C.

The Arguments for and Against a Uniform Fiduciary Duty
Standard

While both sides generally agree that some form of a uniform
fiduciary duty should be imposed,69 positions are split on how the
standard imposed should be defined, how far it should reach in
relation to the standard currently owed by investment advisers,
and the extent to which an equivalent standard would benefit or
65

Id.
Press Release, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, SEC Announces Members of New
Investor Advisory Committee (April 9, 2012) (on file with author).
67
Id.
68
Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—
Pending Action, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/
dfactivity-upcoming.shtml (last modified July 10, 2013).
69
STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 107 (“Many commenters supported a uniform
standard of conduct in some form for investment advisers and broker-dealers
providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers. These
commenters include investors’ advocates, trade groups, state regulators, government
officials, a self-regulatory organization [(FINRA)], industry representatives
(including investment advisers, broker-dealers, and dually registered firms),
coalition groups, academics, investors, and other individuals.”).
66
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harm those it is intended to protect.70 With positions divided
between retail investors and investor-advocates on one side, and
brokers, investment advisers, and insurers on the other,71 the
case for and against imposing a uniform standard of fiduciary
care for financial professionals has gained momentum.
1.

Retail Investors and Investor Advocates Argue that a
Uniform Fiduciary Duty Will Fuel Investor Protection and
Close the Gap on Inconsistent Regulation of Financial
Professionals

For retail investors and investor-advocates, the argument is
simple: imposing a uniform fiduciary duty for brokers and
investment advisers will make it easier to understand the
obligations owed by trusted financial professionals, regardless of
the hat they wear at the time of sale.72 While it used to be easy
to understand the difference between brokers and investment
advisers acting in their traditional roles, the digital age, the rise
of discount brokerages, and the emergence of one-stop-shops have
changed what used to be separate and distinct roles into hybrid
roles with significant overlap.73 As a result, it has become
difficult to distinguish financial professionals acting in the broker
role from financial professionals acting in the investment adviser
role—even for those with specialized knowledge of the industry.74

70
See Bonnie M. Treichel, Note, The Quest for Financial Regulatory Reform:
Will a Uniform Fiduciary Standard Guide the Way?, 4 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP
& L. 151, 171–74 (2010).
71
See id. (discussing the arguments put forth for and against a uniform
fiduciary duty).
72
Id. at 171 (“[A] uniform fiduciary standard will provide a more
understandable system in which investors who seek to impose liability on their
financial providers will not be confused as to the applicable standard [of care].”); see
STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 101 (“Therefore, in light of this confusion and lack of
understanding, it is important that retail investors be protected uniformly when
receiving personalized investment advice or recommendations about securities
regardless of whether they choose to work with an investment adviser or a brokerdealer.”).
73
See Treichel, supra note 70, at 160; see also STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 99
(noting RAND’s conclusions that over the last few decades the financial services
market has become more complex due to “market demands for new products and
services and the regulatory environment”).
74
See id. (stating how providing increasingly similar services confuses the retail
investor).
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Since retail investors often lack specialized knowledge of the
industry, they are likely to view the role of a financial
professional as a financial professional, instead of as a financial
professional acting as a broker or financial adviser.75 With roles
easily confused, investors are unlikely to understand that the
role their financial professional is acting in will determine
whether they are owed continuing obligations from an
investment adviser or point of sale obligations from a broker
performing the same function.76 A uniform fiduciary duty for
financial professionals will remove much of investors’ confusion
by the different outcomes when investors bring claims against
brokers and investment advisers for breach of their professional
obligations.77
In addition, investor advocates note the added benefit of
requiring brokers to disclose conflicts of interest they might not
otherwise disclose under the existing suitability standard as a
significant benefit of a uniform fiduciary duty.78 Under the
status quo, suitability requires brokers to ensure the products
they sell are suitable to the needs of clients and their individual
risk tolerances at the time of sale.79 As such, it does not require
disclosure of all material conflicts of interest inherent in the sale
itself, such as when the broker knows the broker-dealer is betting
against the product being sold or when a broker’s interest in
higher-commission products conflicts with the client’s interest in

75
See STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 97–99 (discussing the results of an investor
survey that found investors did not understand the difference between investment
advisers and broker-dealers but assumed both acted in the investor’s best interests).
Meanwhile,
Americans seek investment advice, products, and services to help achieve a
variety of goals, such as retirement planning, estate and insurance
planning, educational needs, and the operation of small businesses. Baby
boomers control roughly $13 trillion in household investable assets, or over
50 percent of total U.S. household investment assets, and nearly one in
every six Americans will be 65 or older by the year 2020.
Id. at 93–94.
76
See id. at i (stating that investors do not understand that investment advisors
and broker-dealers are subject to different legal obligations and standards of care).
77
See id. at 107 (recommending a uniform fiduciary standard because investors
“should not have to parse the title on a business card or other information to assess
whether the professional has their best interests at heart”).
78
See Treichel, supra note 70, at 170.
79
See id. at 157 (describing how under the suitability standard, reasonable
efforts must be made to assure that a recommendation comports with a customer’s
objective and financial status).
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higher-return, lower commission products.80 Adhering to a
standard of care equal to that owed by investment advisers
would require brokers to place the interests of investors ahead of
their own and to disclose conflicts of interest that might not
otherwise be disclosed.81
On the regulatory front, Congress and investor advocates
note that a uniform standard will close the gap on inconsistent
regulation of brokers and investment advisers, making the
regulatory framework for financial professionals easier to enforce
than it is under the status quo.82 With brokers held to a lesser
suitability standard while investment advisers are held to higher
fiduciary standard, and brokers primarily regulated by FINRA
while investment advisers are regulated by the SEC, regulation
is inconsistent at best and inadequate in fact. The state of
regulation is best seen in the reality that brokers “are examined
[for compliance] by either FINRA or the SEC at least once a
year,” while investment advisers “are generally only examined by
the SEC once every decade.”83 With compliance examination
occurring more often for brokers than investment advisers,
imposing a uniform fiduciary duty for financial professionals will
bridge the gap of inconsistent regulation of brokers and
investment advisers as trusted financial professionals, making
the regulatory framework for financial professionals easier to
enforce throughout the financial industry.
2.

Brokers and Insurers Argue that a Uniform Fiduciary Duty
Will Force the Overhaul of Existing Business Models, Will
Create Costs Shifted to Retail Investors, and Will Force Ad
Hoc Responses Proponents Failed To Consider

Wall Street argues that adhering to a uniform fiduciary duty
is not so simple for brokers and insurers, whose business models
will be affected by a higher standard of care.84 It argues that
business models will change, creating costs to be shifted to retail
80

See id. at 170 n.110 (explaining that certain investments will result in higher
commission levels than others for brokers working for a brokerage firm having its
own products to sell).
81
See id. at 170.
82
See Bullard, supra note 46, at 9 (discussing Congress’s intent to “harmonize”
the enforcement of rules applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers).
83
Treichel, supra note 70, at 166.
84
See id. at 173–74 (arguing that a universal fiduciary standard will make it
impossible to conduct business as usual).
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investors in the form of higher fees and reduced competition.85
Broker-dealers also argue that requiring a higher standard will
require ad hoc rule making by the SEC, will necessitate the
consolidation of enforcement under a single SRO, and will open
the doors to legal challenges for failure to properly explore the
compound effects of a higher standard of care on industry
stakeholders.86
Opponents of the uniform fiduciary standard claim that this
will lead to an increase in the costs of doing business throughout
the financial industry.87 For example, broker-dealers will need to
study whether existing fee structures comply with a fiduciary
standard of care, will increase the costs of training to comply
with fiduciary obligations, and will increase the costs of
compliance.88 Where firms can afford the costs of compliance,
costs will shift to consumers in the form of higher fees.89 Where
firms cannot afford the costs of compliance, costs will shift
nonetheless, as the loss of less-established firms forces the flight
to more-established, higher fee firms.90 Insurers argue that their
business models will be affected as well.91 With existing business
models built around the sale of variable annuities, requiring
adherence to a fiduciary standard in the offering and sale of
securities will require adherence to the same standard by
insurance professionals, increasing the costs of offering variable
rate annuities and traditional insurance products to offset the
cost of compliance.92
As a reverberating theme, consumers will carry the increase
in costs—whether or not they receive the benefit of those services
received—rather than the firms that realize them.93 In short,

85

See id.
Id. at 172–75; ASS’N FOR ADVANCED LIFE UNDERWRITING (AALU), MORE
ECONOMIC AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS TO BE REQUIRED IN SEC RULEMAKINGS
(May 23, 2012), http://aaluwr.org/displayreport.php?wrID=2839.
87
See Treichel, supra note 70, at 173–74.
88
See id. at 173 (noting that broker-dealers will have to change their line of
work to comply with the new standards).
89
See id. (complying with a new fiduciary standard will be a great expense that
the investor will bear “in some form or another”).
90
See id. (arguing that the expense to comply with the new fiduciary standards
will force broker-dealer firms to shut down, thereby burdening retail investors with
the task of finding new financial institutions).
91
Id. at 173–74.
92
Id. at 174.
93
See id.
86
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while requiring brokers and insurers to adhere to a higher
standard of care, the costs of complying with such a standard will
shift to those it is intended to protect, that is, to consumers of
brokerage, investment advisory, and variable rate annuity
products, as well as to those that will never see the benefit, that
is, to consumers of traditional insurance products.94 If Wall
Street’s arguments were true, an exodus of broker-dealers from
states that already impose a fiduciary duty would have occurred.
VI. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S FIDUCIARY STANDARD
At the same time the federal government and SEC sought to
propose a new fiduciary duty, the Department of Labor (“DOL”)
set out to amend its thirty-five-year-old fiduciary rule.95 On
October 22, 2010, approximately three months after Dodd-Frank
was signed into law, the Department of Labor sought to amend a
rule under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”) “that, upon adoption, would protect beneficiaries of
pension plans and individual retirement accounts by more
broadly defining the circumstances under which a person is
considered to be a ‘fiduciary’ by reason of giving investment
advice to an employee benefit plan or a plan’s participants.”96
The proposed rule responded to significant changes in the
financial industry that increased the types and complexity of
investment products and services available.97 Its purpose was “to
protect participants from conflicts of interest and self-dealing by
giving a broader and clearer understanding of when persons
providing such advice are subject to ERISA’s fiduciary
standards.”98

94

See id. at 172–74.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, US Labor Department Proposes Rule
Defining ‘Fiduciaries’ of Employee Benefit Plans (October 21, 2010) (on file with U.S.
Dep’t of Labor).
96
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,263 (proposed Oct.
22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510).
97
Id. at 65,264.
98
Id.
95
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One year later, on September 19, 2011, the DOL withdrew
its proposed fiduciary rule99 after criticism from the financial
industry and lawmakers.100 Opponents argued that the proposed
rule was too broad and lacked a sufficient cost-benefit analysis.101
In response, the DOL announced its plan to re-propose a new
fiduciary rule in early 2012 after a cost benefit/regulatory impact
analysis.102 In early 2012, the DOL expanded its “regulatory
impact analysis” to assess what kind of impact the DOL’s reproposed fiduciary rule would have on the financial industry,
which in turn postponed re-proposal to the summer of 2012.103
Currently, the DOL is in the process of re-proposing a new
fiduciary rule.
According to Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Secretary of the
Department
of
Labor’s
Employee
Benefit’s
Security
Administration,
[e]ven if the SEC and DOL collaborated on the same definition
of fiduciary, it wouldn’t really get [the brokerage industry] what
they want, which is a single set of rules, because even if the

99
Margaret Collins, Labor Department Will Delay Its Fiduciary Rule, Borzi
Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2011-09-19/labor-department-will-delay-its-fiduciary-rule-borzi-says.html.
100
Mark Schoeff Jr., INsider: Timeline for Fiduciary Rule Slip-Sliding Away,
INVESTMENTNEWS, Jan. 9, 2012, http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120109/
FREE/120109950 [hereinafter INsider]; Mark Schoeff Jr., Cost Analysis Could End
DOL Proposal, INVESTMENTNEWS, Apr. 29, 2012, http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20120429/REG/304299973 [hereinafter Cost Analysis].
101
Cost Analysis, supra note 100 (“Skeptics contend that the initial rule that the
Labor Department proposed in 2010 would subject brokers making individual
retirement account sales to a fiduciary duty under federal retirement law for the
first time, potentially pushing them out of the IRA market.”); INsider, supra note
100; Jessica Toonkel, Labor Department Not Deterred in Fiduciary Rule Proposal,
REUTERS, Mar. 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/19/us-labordeptfiduciary-idUSBRE82I10620120319.
102
INsider, supra note 100.
103
Melanie Waddell, DOL Deadline on Fiduciary IRA Request Set for Feb. 24,
ADVISORONE, Feb. 16, 2012, http://www.advisorone.com/2012/02/16/dol-deadline-onfiduciary-ira-request-set-for-feb; see Mark Schoeff Jr., Looming Election Slams
Brakes on Fiduciary Regs, INVESTMENTNEWS, May 27, 2012, http://www.investment
news.com/article/20120527/REG/305279994 (re-proposing the rule “as early as this
summer”); see also Melanie Waddell, DOL’s Borzi: Retirement Fiduciary Re-Proposal
Out Early Next Year, ADVISORONE, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.advisorone.com/2011/
10/25/dols-borzi-retirement-fiduciary-re-proposal-out-ea (re-proposing the rule
“shortly after the first of the year”).
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same people were defined as fiduciaries, the rules that they
would be subject to as fiduciaries in the two different statutory
schemes would be so very different.104

Nonetheless, Borzi emphasized that while the two rules “can’t be
identical”—“they can be consistent and compatible.”105
VII. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
When new customers walk into a brokerage firm’s lobby for
the first time, the customers meet a broker and sit down in an
office for a discussion of their specific needs and goals. After
some conversation, if the customers decide to do business with
the broker, the customers will hand over substantial portions of
their savings from their life’s work, trusting that the broker will
handle their funds appropriately. When this occurs, the brokerdealer becomes a trusted agent of the customers. Specifically,
the customers have placed their trust and confidence in the
brokerage firm’s ability to adequately manage their money. At
the moment the customers deliver all or a substantial portion of
their net worth to a broker, they justifiably believe, and indeed
are told, that they can trust that the broker will act as their
fiduciary.
Customers that have suffered some type of wrongdoing are
surprised when Wall Street quickly disclaims any duty owed, let
alone a fiduciary duty, after litigation or arbitration has
commenced. The post-dispute disclaimer of a duty owed to the
customers is true in virtually all cases defended by brokerdealers. A broad based fiduciary duty would help curtail this
Wall Street practice and help close the credibility gap between
what is said to customers when their accounts are opened and
what is argued to arbitrators after a dispute has arisen.
CONCLUSION
Today, the SEC and DOL control the fate of whether or not
there will be a uniform fiduciary standard. The adoption of a
uniform fiduciary duty requiring all broker-dealers to act in the
best interests of their clients and make full and fair disclosures

104
Melanie Waddell, Phyllis Borzi: The 2012 IA 25 Extended Profile,
ADVISORONE, May 16, 2012, (alteration in original), http://www.advisorone.com/
2012/05/16/phyllis-borzi-the-2012-ia-25-extended-profile.
105
Id.

FINAL_BAKHTIARI, BOICE & MAJORS

2013]

TIME FOR A UNIFORM FIDUCIARY DUTY

2/27/2014 6:20 PM

335

would be a step in the right direction. A single broad-based
uniform fiduciary standard would better serve investors by
enhancing transparency and protecting the integrity of the
marketplace. The time for a uniform fiduciary duty is now.

